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Essays
The Unruly Character of Politics
Owen M. Fiss*

Every age has its issue and ours may be abortion. It has posed many challenges
to the Supreme Court, above all that of reexamining the long discredited doctrine of
substantive due process. The 1973 ruling in favor of the individual woman's right to
choose to have an abortion sharply divided the Court and over the next two decades
the Court has had to revisit the issue to see whether the initial ruling should be
affirmed, as indeed it has been.'
Beyond that, the Court has had to find a place within the constitutional order for
the losers: To what extent shall those opposed to abortion be allowed to air their
views and keep the controversy alive? Because the pro-life forces have not been
content to advance their cause only through the ballot box or the courts, but have
most decidedly taken to the streets, specifically to picket abortion clinics and the
doctors who work in them, the abortion controversy has also forced the Supreme
Court to probe the limits of the First Amendment and its guarantee of free speech.
This is my subject.
I.
Some commentators have cast the function of the First Amendment in
individualistic terms and portray it as a protection of each person's right to selfexpression. To these theorists, speaking is just another individual activity,
comparable to hiking or working, and like those activities should be free from state
interference unless the state can come forward with a pretty good reason for its
action. This theory does not, however, fully explain the special commitment the
Constitution has toward the protection of speech. A better reason is needed for
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protecting speech and in search of that reason the prevailing theory of the
Amendment ties the right of free speech to society's interest in democracy.2
Within the terms of individualistic theory, it is hard to understand why the
interests of speakers or protestors should take priority over the interests of those hurt
or offended by the speech, or simply inconvenienced by it. There would be a conflict
of individual interests and no basis for preferring one over the other. The Constitution is not, however, neutral in this conflict. It tilts the scales in favor of the
speaker, and the most plausible explanation for this tilt arises from the contribution
speech makes to democracy. According to this theory, which so dominates the field
today, what the First Amendment seeks to further is not self-expression, but
collective self-determination.
The democratic theory of the First Amendment can be traced to the work of
Alexander Meiklejohn and Harry Kalven, who, in turn, often made recourse to the
metaphor of a town meeting to elaborate upon the role of speech in the process of
collective self-determination.3 In this metaphor, society is viewed as a gigantic
assembly in which all the citizens are gathered. The citizens need to make a decision
on some pressing issue of the day, but before doing so they must hear all the conflicting viewpoints. Speaker after speaker rises to identify the options before the
gathering and provide the information needed to assess those options. Those
participating in the town meeting will listen, argue, and then, finally, vote. The vote
is the act of collective self-determination and the speeches that occur before that vote
enable citizens to understand themselves, identify their needs, and discover how
those needs might be satisfied. In the context of a town meeting, speech is a form of
enlightenment.
Although some forms of protest activity comport with the understanding of the
function of speech projected by the metaphor of the town meeting, this is not true of
the most salient form of protest activity of the anti-abortion movement these
days-picketing in front of abortion clinics or the homes of doctors who perform
abortions. Such picketing makes claim to protection of the First Amendment and
invokes the democratic theory of Meikeljohn and Kalven to support that claim, but
on reflection seems only tenuously connected to enlightenment.
True, these picketers usually carry signs, "Abortion kills," "Doctor Jones is a
Murderer," or "Jesus Saves." Sometimes the protestors convey the same message
through shouting or singing and to the extent that they do, they may be seen as the
equivalent of the speakers in a town meeting. They too are engaged in the process of
enlightenment in so far as they make reasons and arguments publicly available, and

2.
See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFIIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); Lee C.
Bollinger, FreeSpeech andIntellectual Values, 92 YALE LJ. 438 (1983); Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand
Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND LJ. 1 (1971); Paul G. Stem, Note, A PluralisticReading of the First
Amendment and Its Relation to Public Discourse,99 YALE LJ. 925 (1990).
3.
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apply them to an issue of great public significance. But this overlooks one crucial
feature of picketing, namely its locational specificity-it takes place in front of a
particular physical structure, say, an abortion clinic or the doctor's house.
Picketing has a long and noble history in American politics, used not just by prolifers, but also by organized labor, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and perhaps
most heroically by civil rights activists. In many of these cases, say labor, the
locational specificity of picketing can be justified in enlightenment terms. The relevant public the union wishes to reach are the customers who are about to use the
store, and the most sensible way of reaching those persons and informing them of the
labor dispute is by marching or standing in front of the store. In the case of abortion
picketing, however, there is no analogous rationale for the targeted quality of the
protest activity.
Picketing in front of the doctor's house does not tell the doctor anything he does
not already know, whether that he performs abortions or that some citizens believe
such activity to be immoral. The doctor's neighbors may not know that he performs
abortions, but to convey that message the picketers need not stand in front of the
doctor's house. Indeed, that site does not seem an especially compelling way of
informing the public or the doctor's neighbors. If their purpose is to enlighten the
neighbors or the public in general, the protestors may walk through the neighborhood, send letters to the neighbors, stand on the town green, or distribute flyers
outside the local shopping center.
Similarly, no new information is conveyed by picketing an abortion clinic. The
relevant targets of this activity are the persons who work in the clinic and those who
are about to use the services offered, but these persons know everything that the
protestors seek to tell them. The facility holds itself out as an abortion clinic. Every
one who enters it, and thus encounters the picketers on the way in, already knows
whatever the picketer is likely to say. As with the residential picketers, the protestors
in front of the abortion clinic may have their eyes on the broader public, for example,
persons who casually drive by or who might watch a news broadcast of the picketing
on television later that night. But once again, that purpose does not require that the
picketers patrol in front of the clinic. Many alternative sites are available for
informing the public of their cause.
Maybe the persons about to use the clinic or the doctors who perform abortions
need a reminder about the moral consequences of their action. That is, however,
hardly the kind of enlightenment contemplated in the town meeting. A speaker who
stubbornly and constantly reiterates a well-known position stands on different footing
than a speaker who aims to impart new information or to elaborate on a point through
reasoned arguments.
The locational specificity of abortion picketing is in fact crucial to the protesters.
To understand why, however, we need to change the terms of reference and under-

4.
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stand that the purpose of such picketing is not enlightenment but confrontation.
Abortion picketers are confronting the doctors, nurses, and pregnant women on the
moral consequences of their actions in an effort to get them to desist from those
actions. In biblical terms, they see themselves as bearing witness to a grave misdeed.
A moral confrontation, as exemplified by abortion picketing, consists of four
elements. First, there must be a declaration of opposition and an indication of the
grounds of opposition. This is the function of the signs the picketers carry and, to a
certain extent, the songs that they sing.
Second, confrontation requires a sacrifice or inconvenience on the part of the
protestors. In fact, the word "witness," as it appears in the Bible, is a translation of
the Greek word "martys," which is etymologically connected to "martyr." The sacrifice implied in witnessing, or a moral confrontation, indicates the moral seriousness
of the objection being voiced and thus adds weight to that objection. Spending time
on a picket line in front of a doctor's house or a clinic is indeed a sacrifice, though,
of course, the measure of the sacrifice increases as the fair weather turns to rain, and
as the patrolling takes place during the workday. Among its many functions, the
singing on a picket line, like the hymns in a religious service, binds people together
and strengthens their resolve to take a stand and suffer the necessary sacrifices.
Third, a moral confrontation requires a public encounter between the objector
and the wrongdoer. The need for such an encounter explains the locational specificity
of the picketing-why it must be in front of the doctor's house or the clinic and not
on the town green or elsewhere in the neighborhood. The physical proximity of
objector and wrongdoer signifies that both are members of the same community and
that, by virtue of this fact, the objector has the right to make claims upon the alleged
wrongdoer.
Fourth, the purpose of this encounter is to change behavior, and it seeks to
achieve this purpose not by the persuasive force of an argument but by the demonstration of moral seriousness. The changes sought by a parade or mass demonstration
are general in nature-a change in the law, for example. In contrast, the behavioral
changes contemplated in targeted picketing in the abortion context tend to be more
individualized. Those on the picket line hope to save fetus after fetus by confronting
those performing abortions or those about to have them.
Confrontation has an important role to play in democratic politics, and thus can
rightly make claim to protection under the First Amendment. That is why picketing
is speech. Of course, as a matter of ordinary discourse, picketing, whether its purpose
be enlightenment or confrontation, is not considered speech, but that is not the
appropriate test. As in all legal interpretation, to demarcate the bounds of the First
Amendment we proceed by identifying the underlying purpose of that constitutional
provision and then give meaning to the critical phrases in light of that purpose.5

5.
See generally BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, PRivATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); KALVEN,
supranote 4.
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Constitutional interpretation is a matter of functional analysis, not ordinary language,
and from that vantage point, picketing should be considered speech or, more
specifically, as falling within the ambit of "the freedom of speech" because of its
contribution to the democratic practice of self-governance. This is true whether the
purpose of picketing be enlightenment or confrontation.
Admittedly, confrontation has no place in the town meeting, but that now strikes
me as a limitation of the metaphor.6 Reference to the town meeting seems unfortunate in so far as it ties speech to the vote and thus reduces self-determination to the
electoral process. Periodic elections are indeed crucial to democracy, for they put the
ultimate power of governance in the hands of citizens, yet we should not make, and
have not made, elections the full measure of democracy. Supplements or correctives
are sometimes needed and confrontational protests, like picketing, might usefully be
seen as an electoral supplement.
The need for such a supplement was abundantly clear in the civil rights context,
and that is why confrontational politics was so privileged there. In many instances,
blacks were disenfranchised and thus systematically excluded from the electoral
process. Even when that was not the case, the need for an electoral supplement arose
from their status as "a discrete and insular minority"--few in number and victims of
traditions of prejudice that disabled them from forming or participating in the
coalitions that are the mainstay of electoral politics. 7 Those who engage in abortion
protests are not disenfranchised nor are they a discrete and insular minority-for a
good part of our history they have been the victors in electoral politics. Yet they too
can point to shortcomifigs of the electoral process and thus make a strong case for the
need for confrontational politics.
One of their needs derives from the constitutionalization of the abortion debate
that has occurred over the last 25 years, first in Roe v. Wade and then again in Casey.
Those decisions increased the electoral burdens that those opposed to abortion must
surmount. No simple majority suffices fof them. In order to achieve their purposes,
they must garner the support needed for a constitutional amendment or some decisive
shift in Court personnel.
Another need for an electoral supplement-shared by all protestors, regardless
of their cause-derives from the well-known difficulty of registering intensities
through voting. Although the importance people attach to their position varies greatly
from person to person and although the depth of their feeling can be expressed in
their speeches, in what they say as well as how they say it, all these differences are

6.
For a different criticism of the town meeting, see Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of PublicDiscourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993), reprintedin ROBERT C. POST,
CONSITrUT ONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, CoMmuNrrY, MANAGEMENT 268 (1995). For my response to Post, see
OWEN M. Fiss, The Right Kind of Neutrality,in LIBERALISM DIVIDED 109 (1996). For a more extensive analysis
and critique of Post's position, see Morris Lipson, Note, Autonomy and Democracy, 104 YALE L.J. 2249 (1995).
7.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a consideration of the role
of minorities in the democratic process, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond CaroleneProducts,98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
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washed out when it comes to voting. Each person in the town meeting has only one
vote. The "one person, one vote" rule may be democracy's way of affirming the
moral equality of citizens on an abstract and symbolic level, but this does not deny
the relevance or importance of registering intensities in collective-will formation.
Confrontational politics is a way of giving expression to those intensities.
Protests also have an agenda-setting function. Politicians have an incentive to
avoid taking positions on divisive issues, as any such position will alienate some
portion of the electorate. But a democracy is not well served if its officials systematically skirt issues of overriding importance to private citizens. Protests are an
important means of spotlighting those issues, and thus setting the agenda on which
future elections will be won or lost.
Moreover, protests advance an important democratic function insofar as they are
issue-specific. A vote for a particular candidate endorses a bundle of economic and
social policies, and will invariably entail some measure of compromise. Thus, a
pro-choice majority may elect a pro-life candidate if, for example, that candidate
espouses popular fiscal policies. As most matters of public significance are not
determined by referendum, citizens rarely have an opportunity to register their views
on specific issues. Protesting focuses criticism on the activity that inspires it, rather
than filtering criticism through a political candidate who will generally be associated
with a broad range of policies and positions.
Elections occur at regular intervals-2 years, 4 years, and sometimes even 6
years. Protests give the citizens the capacity to address issues of public importance
during the interim, to respond to a new change or a shift in public policy, or as a way
of keeping controversy alive between elections.
Finally, protests emphasize that certain social phenomena are objectionable for
reasons of morality, as opposed to reasons of policy, and allow the individual to
make clear the grounds of objection. Opposition to a city sponsored abortion clinic
may be based on many grounds-fiscal conservatism, a desire to preserve the residential character of a neighborhood, the fear of an increase in traffic, or the moral
character of the action occurring there. Voting in an election, or even a referendum,
does not permit the citizen to give the ground of objection or to reveal its special
character and the kind of response that will suffice-arguments from principle
deserve a principled answer.
SIIL

Emphasizing the confrontational rather than the informational element of
picketing requires us to reexamine the nature of democratic politics, to avoid the
reduction of democracy to elections and to see the need for what I have called
electoral supplements. This conception of picketing also places the need for state
regulation in proper perspective. Even in the town meeting, where speech is
informational, the state has an important role to play; the state must act as a parlia-
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mentarian, making certain that all voices are heard! However, the need for state
intervention is significantly more urgent in a moral confrontation, for the danger is
ever present that the public encounter that lies at the core of that activity will get out
of hand. Objectors, driven by moral or even religious imperatives and prepared to
make sacrifices for the good of the cause, are likely to press and press until their aims
are achieved. The state must set the bounds on the confrontation.
The state commonly seeks to perform this function through the issuance of
injunctions. The great attraction of the injunction as a regulatory instrument arises
from its context specificity. Because an injunction is issued in a particular case, it can
take into account the particular circumstances of the situation at hand and thus
regulate with a great deal of precision. 9 No more speech need be curbed than necessary. The injunction was commonly used to regulate picketing in the labor context,
and again during the civil rights era. But in the early 1970s it became ensnared in a
First Amendment doctrine-the rule against prior restraints-that threatened its
availability in the abortion context.
Standard First Amendment doctrine disfavors any regulation of speech. This
applies to criminal statutes as well as injunctions. In 1971, in the PentagonPapers
case, however, the Supreme Court placed a special disability on injunctions, thereby
making them even more disfavored than criminal statutes. 10 Classifying injunctions
as prior restraints, the Court ruled that, save in the most exceptional circumstances,
for example, to prevent a publication that would disclose troop movements, judges
should never issue injunctions against speech. Of course, the doctrine that treated
injunctions as prior restraints pre-dated the PentagonPaperscase. In fact, its roots
can be traced all the way back to Nearv. Minnesota in the 1930s." But the Pentagon
Paperscase gave that doctrine a very special authority and prominence and thus
created in the modem period a most formidable barrier against the issuance of
injunctions regulating protest activities.
In my view, this turn in the law was unfortunate, for it ignores the structural
similarity between criminal statutes and injunctions-both try to prevent future
action by threatening punishment. In a sense, both are prior restraints, and there is
no reason to place special disabilities on injunctions or to make them more
disfavored than criminal statutes. Injunctions are more specific than statutes, but the
ability to fine-tune regulation allows the state to suppress unacceptable conduct without constraining activities worthy of First Amendment protection.

For an elaboration of this claim, see OwEN M. FiSS, THE IRoNY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
Thus, injunctions have a certain advantage over statutes, which necessarily deal in generalities. See, e.g.,
9.
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances, 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1997) (prohibiting injury of,
intimidation of, or interference with, persons entering a reproductive health facility). 18 U.S.C.S. § 248(d)(1)
stipulates that the statute shall not be construed to prohibit any activity protected by the First Amendment, but
cannot, of course, specify what conduct is permissible in any particular case.
10. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
11. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8.
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Individuals charged with violating a criminal statute can claim in defense that the
statute violates the First Amendment. In contrast, individuals charged with violating
an injunction may under certain circumstances be barred from raising any First
Amendment objections to the order.' 2 But this difference between criminal statutes
and injunctions is entirely of the Supreme Court's creation. It would thus be the most
flagrant of bootstrap arguments if this difference was used to justify the extra burden
on injunctions. It would be much more sensible to lift what is referred to as the
"collateral bar rule" and allow the First Amendment defense to be asserted in the
criminal contempt proceeding than to bar their use altogether in managing confrontational politics.
For these reasons, during the 1970s and 1980s a number of commentators,
including myself, maintained that the prior restraint doctrine should not be applied
to injunctions.' 3 Injunctions should be strictly scrutinized, but no more or less so than
criminal statutes. Yet the Court was of a different mind. In fact, following the
PentagonPapersdecision the prior restraint doctrine became a favorite of the Burger
Court and was invoked with greater and greater frequency. In 1994, however, in the
context of abortion picketing, the Court began to disentangle the use of the injunction
from the prior restraint doctrine and took the law of injunctions in a different
direction.
In the case in question, Madsen v. Women's Health Center,Inc., ' 4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld a state court injunction that created a buffer
zone between pro-life picketers and the entrance of the clinic. A small road ran in
front of the clinic, and the picketers were ordered to stand on the other side of that
road-36 feet from the entrance of the clinic, to be precise. The picketers objected
to this injunction on the ground that it was a prior restraint. In a footnote, of all
places, the Court brushed the objection aside and distinguished the injunction sought
in the Pentagon Papers case on two grounds. The Court stressed, first, that the
Madsen injunction, unlike the one sought in PentagonPapers, did not prohibit all
speech, but only geographically limited it. Second, the Court pointed out that the
Madsen injunction was not based on the content of the speech.
The first ground of distinction seems a little strained. The PentagonPaperscase,
and one of its immediate antecedents, 5 treated even interlocutory injunctions as prior
restraints. Such injunctions merely seek to delay or postpone a speech for a limited
period of time (10 days or for the duration of a trial), and thus are limited in their
reach-not geographically, but temporally. Still, the practical effect of the Court's
12. See Walkerv. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). For a discussion of Walker, see David Luban,
Difference Made Legal: The Courtand Dr.King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989).
13. See, e.g., OWEN M. Ftss, Free Speech and the PriorRestraintDoctrine, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED 121
(1996); OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIows INJUNC1rIoN (1978); Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint,
29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); John Calvin Jeffries, Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983).
14. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
15. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); see also Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (treating a temporary injunction as a prior restraint).
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first ground of distinction-sound or not-was to take the injunction out from the
cloud created by PentagonPapersand enable it to be used-without a presumption
of invalidity-to keep the lid on abortion picketing. Such injunctions do not ban
speech altogether, but only define the terms on which it will proceed.
The Court's second ground of distinction had a similar effect. There, the Court
tied the prior restraint doctrine to another doctrine that had come into prominence in
the 1970s and 1980s-the rule against content regulation-and that tie effectively
rendered the prior restraint objection redundant. Like the prior restraint doctrine, the
rule against content regulation creates a strong presumption of invalidity, but is not
in any way keyed or limited to injunctions. It does not rest on any alleged special
feature of the injunction, say, its forward-looking quality. Rather, it seeks to give
expression to the democratic purpose underlying the First Amendment by barring the
state from manipulating the public's decision by favoring one side of the debate over
another. As a result, the rule against content regulation disfavors speech regulations
of any type, provided, of course, one side of the debate is singled out for especially
favored or disfavored treatment.
In his dissent in Madsen, Justice Scalia invoked the rule against content regulation and, with an intemperance that served no one well, insisted that the injunction
should be subject to the near-fatal scrutiny called for by that rule. 6 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, no less committed to overturning Roe, calmly but firmly disagreed.
Paralleling his treatment of the prior restraint doctrine, the Chief Justice refused to
burden injunctions regulating picketing with the presumption of invalidity that comes
from the rule against content regulation. Every injunction, he acknowledged, is context specific, but it is not context specificity that makes an injunction transgress the
rule against content regulation. That rule would be violated only if a disability were
placed on one group of protestors-the pro-lifers-that would not be placed on
others, for example, those in favor of choice, or those engaged in labor or civil rights
struggles against the clinic. The judge issuing the injunction did not address or
provide those hypothetical situations, nor should he have, but the mere fact that the
injunction is addressed to one particular contestant does not necessarily mean that
they were singled out for especially disfavored treatment.
Admittedly, the context specificity of the injunction presents, as Scalia warned,
the danger of abuse. Confronting a specific protest the judge may give vent to his
feelings about the merits of the protest and structure the order issued in such a way
as to make it harsher on the pro-lifers than it would be if he were confronted with
picketing by pro-choice or civil rights activists. The dispute in all its particularity is
before the judge and he may be swept up in it. But to treat injunctions as presumptively invalid for that reason seems to make too much of the risk of abuse. It

16. Justice Scalia refers to a videotape of the picketing which was made by employees of, or volunteers at,
the abortion clinic. According to Justice Scalia, "Anyone seriously interested in what this case was about must view
the tape." 512 U.S. at 786. In an effort to comply, I attempted to obtain the tape, only to learn that it is not on record
with the Court. I was eventually able to procure a copy, and it is now on file at the library of the Yale Law School.
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overlooks a judge's capacity for impartiality. It also slights the genuine advantages
to First Amendments values that come from allowing the government to regulate
through injunctions as opposed to criminal statutes. As the Norris-LaGuardia Act
teaches, in the labor context there may be special reasons for disfavoring injunctions;
the privileged economic status of judges may lead them to identify with the
employer. 17 But no such reason for systematic distrust exists in the abortion context.
The Madsen Court's ruling on the prior restraint objection freed injunctions
regulating picketing from a presumption of invalidity. Its ruling on the applicability
of the rule against content regulation had a similar effect: No presumption of
invalidity should attach simply by virtue of the fact that an injunction is addressed
to some particular group of protestors (and not others). In reaching this conclusion
the basic sympathies of the majority were manifest: The Justices saw the danger and
believed that the injunction could play a useful role in setting the bounds of the confrontation. Yet, also to its credit, the Court was careful not to create a presumption
of validity in favor of the injunction. The Court was prepared to review the injunction
case-by-case, indeed provision-by-provision, to see whether First Amendment values
were fully respected. Injunctions regulating picketing in front of abortion clinics
were to be judged on a retail, rather than a wholesale, basis.
II.
Doctrinal disputes on the First Amendment often revolve around the level of
scrutiny-strict? intermediate? ordinary?-that is to be applied to the challenged
regulation. Madsen provided new material for the treatise writers by creating a
standard putatively in-between "intermediate scrutiny" and "strict scrutiny" for
judging an injunction regulating picketing. According to the Court, the particular
restraint must serve a government interest that is "significant," and in pursuit of that
end, the regulation must "burden no more speech than necessary." '8 In a 1997 sequel,
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, a majority of the Court
reaffirmed this test1 9 The Court's opinion was once again written by the Chief
Justice. There was another high-pitched dissent by Justice Scalia.
In both Madsen and Schenck, the Court used the new in-between test to justify
buffer zones between the picketers and the entrance or driveways of the clinic-in
Madsen the buffer zone was 36 feet; in Schenck it was 15 feet. (In Schenck, the
injunction allowed two protestors, known in the trade as "sidewalk counselors," to
enter the buffer zone to talk to the person entering the clinic, on the condition that
they withdraw once the would-be patient indicated that she wished the conversation

17. Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90,47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982)).
For more on the use of the injunction in the labor context, see FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE
LABOR lNiJNCnON (2d ed. 1963).

18. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
19. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
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to end.) In each case, the Court struck down a number of other provisions of the
injunction on the theory that they were broader than necessary to serve the relevant
state interest-in Schenck the invalidated provision created a floating buffer zone that
traveled with persons entering the clinic; in Madsen the invalidated provisions
created a 300-foot zone around the clinic in which protestors could not approach
would-be patients who did not consent to talk, as well as establishing similar zones
around certain private residences and barring the use of images observable by
patients in the clinic.2 Yet the principal thrust of both these decisions was to
legitimate the creation of a physical space-a buffer zone of modest proportions
-between the picketers and the entrance or driveways of the clinic.
The creation of such a zone seems wholly consistent with the First Amendment
and effectuates a just accommodation of the conflicting interests. Scalia felt that by
pushing the picketers back from the entrance of the clinic the state is siding with the
pro-choice forces and thus breaching its duty to be neutral between contending viewpoints. But this is not so. What neutrality requires in this context is that the restraint
be justified on grounds that are independent of the merits of the underlying dispute.
What justified the buffer zones created in Madsen and Schenck was not a desire to
disfavor the protestors or a hostility to their views, but rather another set of interests
altogether-in the Court's mind, public safety and order, promoting the free flow of
traffic, protecting property rights, and the freedom of women to seek pregnancyrelated services.2'
In the town meeting, where speech is enlightenment and the state is the parliamentarian, the intervention of the state could be judged in terms of effects. Even if
the ruling of the parliamentarian rests on neutral grounds, it may have the effect of
disadvantaging one side and for that reason interfere with self-governance. Imagine,
for example, a ruling that required all speakers to use microphones even though the
state does not provide them. The decision not to provide microphones might be based
on a resource constraint, and the requirement of using a microphone might be based
on consideration of audibility. Still, the unequal impact, and the threat to First
Amendment, would be manifest. The poor would be less able to speak, and public
debate would be skewed.
In the context of picketing, however, we cannot hope for neutral effects. The
space for that kind of neutrality does not exist. Two parties are symbolically locked
in combat; any intervention by the state will necessarily alter the terms of the encounter and thus affect the balance of power. In terms of effects, state intervention
can never be neutral. Nor would standing on the sidelines, doing nothing, be neutral
in terms of effects, for that simply affirms the status quo and its distribution of
power. All that one can hope for in picketing is neutrality of grounds, knowing full

20. The Madsen Court did, however, uphold a restriction on the amount of noise the picketers could make.
See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
21. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768; see also Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 866.
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well that even if that can be achieved, the order will have non-neutral
consequences-the pro-lifers may be pushed back and in that sense disfavored.
What neutrality of grounds seeks to ensure is that the state cannot silence or
disadvantage a party to a dispute simply because it disagrees with that party's
position-the state cannot decree that one side is right and the other wrong. At the
very foundation of the First Amendment, as Justice Brennan pointed out in the flagburning case, 22 lies the principle that prohibits state officials from suppressing speech
simply because they happen to disagree with it. It is that principle which requires the
Court, at a minimum, to look at the reason for the regulation of speech.
In Schenck, the Court went beyond Madsen to make clear that the reason
requirement was to be objectively understood: What matters is not what actually
moved the judge, but rather what could be said on behalf of the injunction. This issue
arose in the context of assessing the provision of the injunction allowing two socalled "sidewalk counselors" to enter the buffer zone to talk to the would-be patients.
As a restriction on the grant of access, the District Court provided would-be patients
with a cease and desist power-the right to stop conversations whenever they
desired. This power, the judge said, is needed to protect their right to be let alone.
Addressing the cease-and-desist power, the Supreme Court commented, "We
doubt that the District Court's reason for including that provision-to protect the
right of the people approaching and entering the facilities 'to be left alone'accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence ....,23 The Court went on to
conclude, however, that the cease-and-desist power could be justified as a means of
preventing "harassment" and "intimidation." Although the District Judge had not
used fear of harassment or intimidation as the predicate for the cease-and-desist
power, the Supreme Court noted that he had found that sidewalk counselors had been
arrested for harassing and intimidating would-be patients and that they persisted in
that objectionable conduct after their arrests. For the Supreme Court what was crucial
was the possible, not the actual, ground of decision. If grounds for the intervention
existed that were neutral between the contending forces, then it could not be said, at
least on one level, that state officials were disfavoring one side because it disagreed
with its position or was offended by it. The judge's motivation was wrong; but that
error had no practical effect, for good grounds existed for his action.
Neutrality of grounds is not, however, the entire measure of the state's duty. The
First Amendment also entitles protestors to a reasonable opportunity to publicly
encounter the alleged wrongdoer, for without such a public encounter, there can be
no confrontation or witnessing in the classical sense, and the democratic values
served by such protest activity will remain unfulfilled. In the context of a town
meeting, the requisite social interaction is assumed by the metaphor itself. All the

22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.")
23. Schenck, 117 S.Ct. at 870.
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people are sitting in one room, debating one another. But when we turn to picketing,
the forum for the encounter cannot be assumed; it is created by the state in the act of
defining the bounds of the protest.
In both the Madsen and Schenck cases, the Court seems fully sensitive to the
need to give the protestors a reasonable opportunity to encounter the alleged wrongdoers. As already noted, in Madsen the Court struck down a provision requiring a
300-foot zone around the clinic in which sidewalk counselors could not approach
would-be patients who did not consent to talk. Such a large buffer zone-the size of
a football field-would seem to destroy the possibility of a public encounter between
the protestor and the alleged wrongdoer. This cannot be said either of the 36-foot
buffer zone of Madsen or the 15-foot one in Schenck Both permit the picketers and
the persons entering the clinic to be in clear view of one another and in fact to be
physically proximate. Of course, the picketers wanted to be even closer, indeed to
block access, but these buffer zones accommodated the needs of those wanting to use
the clinic and at the same time preserved the capacity of the picketers to confront or
witness those who chose to enter.
The Court seemed, however, less sensitive to First Amendment interests and the
need to preserve the opportunity of confrontation when it addressed the issue of
residential picketing. Admittedly, the Madsen Court invalidated an injunctive provision that created a no-picketing zone around the residences of the staff of the
abortion clinic. That zone was 300-feet, and the Court struck down this provision as
excessive. But the ruling of greater import-both practically and theoretically-on
this issue occurred a number of years earlier in Frisby v. Schultz.24 In that case the
Court effectively eliminated the home as a site of confrontation.
At issue in Frisby was a regulation prohibiting picketing in residential areas. This
regulation took the form of a municipal ordinance rather than an injunction.
Accordingly, the prior restraint doctrine was not applicable. Nor was the rule against
content regulation. As a purely historical matter, the ordinance was passed in
response to protest activity aimed at a doctor who performed abortions. But the ban
enacted applied to all picketing in residential areas and thus could not be attacked on
grounds of the rule against content regulation. Since neither the prior restraint
doctrine nor the rule against content regulation were available, the would-be
picketers turned to yet another First Amendment doctrine, namely, overbreadth.
The overbreadth doctrine allows the Court to invalidate a law regulating speech
whenever the law could be applied to an activity that is constitutionally protected.e

24. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
25. For a more extensive treatment of the overbreadth doctrine, see Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE
L.J. 1103 (1977). See also Note, The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
Overbroad statutes are similar to vague statutes in that both restrict (or may be read to restrict) constitutionally
protected activities. The now classic Note by Professor Anthony Amsterdam is an excellent starting place to explore
the issue of vagueness and its relationship to overbreadth. See Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
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Some of the applications of the law may cover unprotected activity, and some
protected activity, but the very possibility of applying the law to protected activity
renders the law invalid on its face. The law sweeps too widely, as it has been put. To
give substance to that claim in Frisby, the Court was asked to imagine a single,
solitary picketer, standing quietly on public property in front of the doctor's house,
accusing him of murder. In response, the Court acknowledged that the challenged
ordinance could apply to such a situation, but then went on to reject the overbreadth
claim on the ground that such picketing is not protected by the First Amendment.
In reaching that conclusion, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, characterized the interest the state was protecting as the right to privacy. Seen in those
terms, there was a conflict between two prized rights-privacy and speech-and the
municipality was allowed to strike a balance in favor of privacy. The problem,
however, is that the right of privacy, as ordinarily understood, was not threatened.
Because the picketer imagined to test the overbreadth claim stood alone and silently
on public property, there was, by hypothesis, no intrusion into the home or property
of the doctor-no physical entry, no trespass, no electronic projection of the
message, no shouting.
Privacy is a term with many meanings, especially in the law, and O'Connor may
have used it to refer to a "right to be left alone." On a number of occasions, most
recently in Schenck, the Court expressed considerable doubt as to whether there was
any generalized "right to be left alone" on a public street or sidewalk, at least not a
right that could be used to silence protest, but when it came to the home the Court
seemed to be of a different mind. The Frisby Court ruled that in the home there
seems indeed to be "a right to be left alone," which in practical terms makes it
permissible for the state to ban all picketing in front of a home, even if it is peaceful,
quiet, on public property, and consisting of a single person. To reach such a
conclusion, O'Connor must have reasoned that there is a need for zones of
disengagement where people do not have to confront the moral implications of their
actions. Doctors can be confronted in the business sections of the city, where they
work, at the office or clinic, but not when they are at home. There they are entitled
to be free of the worries of the day.
In Frisby,Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented.
Brennan acknowledged the capacity of the state to regulate residential picketing-it
must be on public property, be peaceful, and not intrude into the house of the doctor.
Yet he objected to the capacity of the state to remove all picketing from a residential
area, including the solitary picketer imagined for the purposes of the overbreadth
claim. Such a restriction legitimates a certain moral escapism and thus a
lessening-not an abandonment, but only a lessening--of the commitment to
confrontational politics that seemed to him so essential to democracy.

26. For the original articulation of this now controversial right, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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In the quiet suburban neighborhoods of contemporary America few people walk
the streets. Having a group of people or even one person lurking mysteriously outside
your home is an oddity, and, of course, a source of anxiety. This is the anxiety of
physical presence-a fear that the stranger may try to enter your home or physically
attack you on the way out. No one should have to suffer that kind of anxiety and the
state should take appropriate precautions against the conduct that gives rise to it. The
anxiety produced by the abortion picketer is of another character altogether-it is a
moral anxiety. The doctor is being accused of committing of a heinous crime,
specifically, murder, and the presence of the solitary picketer in front of the doctor's
house is a constant reminder of that accusation. By definition, an act of confrontation
must indicate the grounds of opposition.
The abortion picketer may create both types of anxiety-a physical as well as a
moral anxiety. The doctor may fear, in the spirit of the recent T. Coraghessan Boyle
story," that the picketer may put down his signs and rush his house, or turn angry
and assault him and his family as they enter or leave their home. The state can surely
respond to this danger, but not, if the overbreadth doctrine is to have any meaning,
by banning every one from standing, walking, or patrolling in front of the residence.
The state cannot ban strangers from standing outside the doctor's house. What it can
do is post police officers in front of the house, escalate the stakes for physical
assaults or physical entry, regulate the number of persons picketing the house, and
keep all picketers at a distance from the doors and driveways-all in keeping with
the spirit of Madsen and Schenck. These measures may provide the doctor with
physical protection but not a respite from politics.
Moral anxiety, of course, has its costs-indeed that is the very point of the exercise. Faced with the prospect of having even a single, solitary figure in front of his
house every hour of the day, accusing him of murder, the doctor might well decide
to get out of the business of performing abortions. As a result, women who live in
that community might not be able to exercise the choice extended to them by the
Constitution. Justice Brennan was not unmindful of this risk and surely would be sad
if it materialized. Crucial as he was to the formation of the majority in Roe v. Wade,
he must have hoped that the imagined confrontation would not result in the lessening
of women's choice. Yet his inclination was to rely on the resiliency of the doctor
rather than a command of the state to fulfill his hope. For him, democracy grants
rights but also imposes duties-perhaps a duty to listen-and denies the possibility
of escaping the moral implications of one's actions merely by driving home.2

27. T. Coraghessan Boyle, Killing Babies, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 2, 1996, at 86.
28. The notion of a duty to engage in political dialogue is one of the foundational principles of democratic
self-governance, with deep roots in Frst Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence believed that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government.")
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In their handling of clinic picketing, the Justices appear to have grasped the
imperfection of the electoral process and the essential role of citizen protest in a
democracy. The buffer zones which the Court legitimated worked a sensible accommodation of the competing interests of the protestors and those who are entitled to
use the clinics. In fact, Madsen and Schenck, both written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
might well be taken as a credit to his stewardship. But the Justices stumbled when
they turned in Frisby from the clinics to residential picketing. Moved by the special
attachment they obviously feel toward their homes, a sentiment probably shared by
most Americans, they compromised the democratic commitments that guided them
in Madsen and Schenck
The home is indeed different. It is the locus of our most intimate relationships
and, on the best days, provides some peace from the rough and tumble of the world.
These differences can be safely acknowledged, however, without turning the home
into a refuge of moral escapism. Quite the contrary. Home should be the very place
where we weigh most seriously the implications of our actions. We must use the love
and tranquility that it provides to search our consciences and, through that silent
dialogue known as thought, respond to those who bear witness to all we have done.

